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 Encryption and cryptosystems in electronic
surveillance: a survey of the technology assessment
issues
FRANCK LEPREVOST
1. Introduction
Electronic surveillance is generally considered to be a weapon with which to
fight organised crime or terrorism ([32], Foreword, p. iii). It can, however,
have a darker side, namely that of industrial espionage, violation of privacy, or
both.
The report [35] published by STOA in January 1998 refers to the role played by
the ECHELON network in electronic surveillance (see [8] for a list of links to
this subject). It is a global network which can intercept all telephone, fax or
e-mail communications.
Although it is very difficult to quantify the losses caused by industrial
espionage (many cases are not reported, either because the company fears losing
face or simply because the damage goes undetected), the losses incurred by firms
in the European Union can reasonably be put at several billion euros per year.
The extent of the problem can be surmised from a study published by
PricewaterhouseCoopers Investigation LLC ([27]) on 22 March 1999; the study shows
that over 59% of all firms with a significant presence on the Internet were spied
on in 1998. Furthermore, it is quite conceivable that information acquired by
such means is exploited by the international stock markets. It is an issue which
thus affects shareholders, companies and national economies alike.
The initial purpose of this report is to illustrate the main techniques whereby
EU citizens, firms and institutions can protect themselves, to a certain extent,
against what is now known as economic intelligence.
In Section 2, we outline the various means of communication generally used. We
also describe some of the techniques, of varying degrees of sophistication, by
means of which information can be unlawfully accessed, and some countermeasures
which can be taken. Technological measures allowing data to be transmitted
confidentially require the use of cryptosystems, which are briefly defined and
illustrated in Section 3. In Sections 4, 5 and 6 we outline the latest
developments in secret-key, public-key and quantum cryptographic protocols. As
regards the first two, we give an update on standardisation procedures. In
Section 7 we conduct a technical appraisal of the information security aspects of
the Wassenaar Arrangement, which concerns export controls for conventional arms
and sensitive technological products. We conclude the report by making
recommendations to the European bodies.
This document does not necessarily represent the views of the European
Parliament. Nevertheless, in this report commissioned by STOA, and particularly
in Sections 2, 7 and 8, we systematically viewed things from a standpoint which
we judged to be the most favourable vis-à-vis the defence of European interests.
2. Means of communication used and risks involved
In this section we look at relatively hi-tech methods of communication; direct
oral transmission and traditional mail are therefore not dealt with. For the sake
of clarity and in keeping with standard practice in this field, we have
designated Alice and Bob as two hypothetical individuals wishing to communicate.
2.1 Standard telephones. Standard telephone systems can be tapped without any
technical difficulties: a microphone can be placed inside the telephone set;
alternatively, the wires of the telephone exchange of the building where the
target is located can be tapped, as can those of the telephone company’s central
exchange. These techniques are largely undetectable by the target.
2.2 Voice-scrambling telephones. Secure telephones and fax machines are now
available on the market. Their level of security may be very modest, depending on
the legislation currently in force in their country of origin (see Section 7).
2.3 Fax machines. As things stand, fax machines should be considered as
insecure as telephones. Fax-encrypting machines do exist, but their security
level is contingent on legislation in their country of origin, as above.
2.4 Cordless telephones. Some older models transmit just above the AM
broadcasting band and can thus be easily intercepted. Commercially-available
scanners enable the more recent models to be tapped. Sometimes certain sound wave
inversion techniques are recommended in order to combat tapping, but these
solutions only provide a very low level of confidentiality. As regards cellular
phones, the situation is more complex. Early models transmit in the same way as
radios and so do not provide a high level of confidentiality, since conversations
can be intercepted using inexpensive scanners (equally low-priced equipment can
be purchased to increase the frequencies accessible to the scanners currently on
the market). It is worth mentioning here the US Administration’s attempt to
impose the Clipper standard on all portable phones developed in the United
States. This would have allowed government agencies to retain keys enabling them
to eavesdrop on conversations. Moreover, details of the encryption algorithm
‘Skipjack’, developed by the NSA, have not been made public.
The GSM system, the international standard for digital cellular phones, was
developed by the GSM MoU Association (which became the GSM Association on 30
November 1998) in collaboration with the European Telecommunications Standard
Institute ([13]), an international umbrella organisation bringing together public
authorities, operator networks, manufacturers, service providers and users. GSM
uses cryptographic techniques at various levels. As regards identification, GSM
uses several algorithms, although in practice most operators use a protocol named
COMP128. However, in April 1998 the Smartcard Developer Association ([28]), in
collaboration with David Wagner and Ian Goldberg, researchers at UC Berkeley
(USA), announced that it had developed a system whereby phones using the GSM
standard could be cloned . But on 27 April 1998, Charles Brookson, chairman of
the security group of the GSM MoU Association, stated that this would not be of
any practical use to fraudsters.
With regard to confidentiality, GSM uses a protocol known as A5. There are two
versions of this system: A5/1 and A5/2, which meet different needs. According to
some experts, A5/2 is less secure than A5/1, which we will now discuss. The A5/1
protocol in theory uses 64 bits. But Wagner told us that in practice ([33]), in
every phone he had seen, 10 bits had been systematically replaced with zeros,
thus reducing the theoretical security of the system to 54 bits. The system is
therefore even less secure than the 56 bits offered by DES, which can now be
cracked all too easily (see 4.4). Work conducted before this discovery ([11]) had
already reduced the real security of the system to 40 bits. It is therefore quite
possible that by using similar methods, i.e. assuming that 10 bits are equal to
zero, the actual security level of A5/1 – and hence the confidentiality of
conversations - can be reduced even further.
On 24 February 1999, at the GSM World Congress in Cannes (France), Charles
Brookson announced that GSM security had been reviewed and in particular that
COMP128 had been revised.
2.5 ISDN. It is technically possible to tap an ISDN telephone with the help of
software that remotely activates the monitoring function via the D channel,
obviously without physically lifting the receiver. It is therefore easy to
eavesdrop on certain conversations in a given room.
2.6 Internet communications. In a nutshell, the traditional mail equivalent of
an e-mail on the Internet is a postcard without an envelope. Basically, such
messages can be read. If they are in plaintext, they can be understood and any
‘secret reader’ can take measures which are detrimental to the two parties
wishing to communicate. For example, if Alice sends a message to Bob and if
Charles is a passive attacker, Charles knows what message has been sent but he
cannot modify it. If, on the other hand, he is an active attacker, he can modify
it. One way of circumventing this problem is by encrypting the messages (see
Section 3). However, the solutions developed by Microsoft, Netscape and Lotus for
encrypting e-mails are configured in such a way that the NSA can systematically
read all e-mails thus exchanged outside the United States (although it is
probably the only agency that is able to do so).
2.7 The TEMPEST effect. TEMPEST is the acronym for Temporary Emanation and
Spurious Transmission, i.e. emissions from electronic components of
electromagnetic radiation in the form of radio signals. These emissions can be
picked up by AM/FM radio receivers within a range varying from a few dozen to a
few hundred metres. Building on these data it is then possible to reconstruct the
original information. Protective measures against such risks consist of placing
the source of the emissions (central processors, monitors, but also cables) in a
Faraday cage, or jamming the electromagnetic emissions. The NSA has published
several documents on TEMPEST (see [25]).
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2.8 PSNs. Pentium III processors have a unique serial number called PSN
(Processor Serial Number). Intel devised this technique in order to promote
electronic commerce. The aim of the serial number is to enable anybody ordering
goods via the Internet to be identified. Intel maintains that all users will be
able to retain control over whether or not to allow their serial number to be
read. However, software techniques enabling the number to be read have already
been discovered (see [26]) . It is therefore possible to obtain the PSN secretly
and to track the user without his or her knowledge.
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As it stands, the PSN can therefore be used for electronic surveillance purposes.
Moreover, it is still not known for sure whether PSNs can be cloned. If so, their
use for identification purposes in electronic commerce would have to be ruled
out.
3. An overview of cryptographic techniques
Cryptography is the study of the techniques used to ensure the confidentiality,
authenticity and integrity of information and its origin. Cryptography can be
broadly divided into three categories: private-key, public-key and quantum
cryptography. Several of these techniques make extensive use of hash functions.
Here we give a brief outline of the techniques, explaining them in more detail in
Sections 4, 5 and 6. However, it should be stressed that a high degree of
confidentiality can be attained only by combining these techniques with measures
to counter TEMPEST effects. Basically, it is no use encrypting data if, for
example, they can be read in plaintext while being transferred from the keyboard
to the central processor. Assuming that the information to be processed is in
binary code, the fundamental unit of information referred to in all sections of
this report is the bit, apart from in Sections 3, 4 and 6, where its quantum
equivalent, the qubit, is used.
3.1 Hash functions. These are tools which have multiple applications; amongst
other things, they can be used to create secret keys and electronic signatures.
Their basic function is to rapidly map a file (of any size) to a fixed-size
value, such as 160 bits, as in the European hash function RIPEMD-160. If the
value is known it should be impossible to reconstruct an initial text that would
match the hash value. Essentially, it is very hard to invert. A hash function
should also avoid collisions. In other words, it should not be possible to
construct two distinct files giving the same hash values.
3.2 Secret-key cryptography. With this method, a single key is used both for
encrypting and decrypting. This key should be known only to Alice and Bob. It can
be of varying length. Secret-key cryptography can be divided into two categories:
Stream Ciphers and Block Ciphers. With Stream Ciphers the length of the key is
the same as that of the message to be transmitted. The ‘right’ size, i.e. that
which can be used as a basis for recreating a key the same size as the message,
can be reduced to a fixed size with the help of cryptographically secure
pseudorandom bit generators. These generators have to pass very stringent
statistical tests. As regards Block Ciphers, the size of the key is fixed (56
bits for DES, 128 bits for AES, see 4.3, 4.4). The main problems with this
technique lie in the management and distribution of the keys.
3.3 Public-key cryptography. Unlike the secret-key algorithms, public-key
algorithms require two keys per user. Alice (and Bob respectively) chooses a
secret key, XA (respectively XB) and publishes (e.g. in a directory) a public key
YA (respectively YB). Bob encodes his message with YA and sends it to Alice. Only
Alice, with her secret key XA, can decode the message. The security of public-key
algorithms has a mathematical basis (see Section 5).
See [21] and [23] for details of a report (updated to 31 December 1998) on the
standardisation procedures for AES secret-key protocols (see 4.5) and IEEE-P1363
public-key protocols (see 5.3).
3.4 Quantum cryptography. This method is dealt with in 6.2.
3.5 Cryptanalysis. Cryptanalysis is the perfection of techniques or attacks to
reduce the theoretical security of cryptographic algorithms. This should not be
confused with the hackers’ approach, since they, as a rule, exploit weaknesses
not in the algorithms themselves, but in the security architecture. In 4.4 we
describe a number of attacks on secret-key cryptosystems and in 5.1 and 6.1 on
public-key cryptosystems.
3.6 Security quantification. In general security is evolutive, as it often
depends on the scientific knowledge of a given period. It may be absolute. For
example, the only known form of attack for breaking various Block Ciphers is that
of trying out all possible keys (Brute-Force Attack). Hence, if such a system
uses a 56-bit key, security equals 256 operations. It can also be relative:
theoretically, a cryptosystem is considered to be insecure if it can be
cryptanalysed in polynomial time according to the size of the data. Its degree of
security can be considered satisfactory if it takes a sub-exponential, or better
still, exponential period of time to cryptanalyse. More precise measurements can
be provided in terms of MIPS/year. This unit of measurement is equivalent to a
computer’s computational capacity, carrying out a million instructions per second
over a year (approximately 3.1013 instructions in all).
4. Secret-key cryptography
Secret-key cryptography can be divided into two categories: Stream Ciphers and
Block Ciphers.
4.1 Stream Ciphers. These technologies are only rarely published. Where Block
Ciphers encrypt in blocks, Stream Ciphers encrypt on a bit-by-bit basis. The most
well-known of these, and the most cryptographically secure, is the One-Time Pad,
which requires a key of the same length as the message to be transmitted. This
key must also be created randomly. For practical purposes, the One-Time Pad is
often simulated by means of cyptographically secure pseudorandom bit generators,
often abbreviated to CSPRBG (Cryptographically Strong Pseudo-Random Bit
Generator). Starting with an initial data item X0 (seed), CSPRBG is used to
create deterministically bits which appear to be random. This is then double-
checked by subjecting the CSPRBG candidate to extremely stringent statistical
tests.
4.2 Block Ciphers. With Block Ciphers a message is cut into fixed-length blocks.
With the aid of an algorithm and secret key K of fixed length, but possibly of a
different length to the blocks, each block is encrypted and sent. The recipient
decrypts each block with the same key K. All he or she then has to do is to
‘stick’ the blocks back together to recover the original message. The de facto
standard for algorithms in the Block Cipher category is DES (see 4.4).
4.3 Problems. At least two problems may arise with these methods (Stream Ciphers
and Block Ciphers):
(a) How do Alice and Bob communicate the secret key K to each other?
(b) In a network with n users where n(n – 1))/2 secret keys are needed
(e.g. 499 500 secret keys in a network of 1 000 users), obvious problems
of storage and security need to be addressed.
Public-key (see 5, particularly 5.2) and quantum (see 6.2) cryptography
techniques provide partial solutions to these problems.
4.4 DES: state of the art. The symmetric algorithm most widely used at present
is undoubtedly DES (Data Encryption Standard). In 1997 it was recognised as an
FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standard) and registered as FIPS 46-2. DES
uses a 56-bit key. There are therefore 256 possible keys. The block length is 64
bits.
DES has enjoyed the political backing of the United States for a very long time.
As recently as 17 March 1998, for example, Robert S. Litt (Principal Associate
Deputy Attorney-General) maintained that the FBI did not have the technological
and financial capacity to decrypt a message encrypted with a symmetric 56-bit
secret-key algorithm. He concluded by stating that 14 000 Pentium PCs would need
to be used for four months in order to achieve such a feat (see also statements
by Louis J. Freeh (Director of the FBI) and William P. Crowell (Deputy Director
of the NSA, [10], p. 1-2).
Nevertheless, the Electronic Frontier Foundation built a DES cracker and
presented it at an informal (Rump) session of the Crypto ’98 conference in Santa
Barbara. The machine (worth USD 250 000, including the design) is described in
[10]. Better still, the book explains how to scan the plans in order to reproduce
the machine for a maximum outlay of USD 200 000 (basically there is no need to
pay over again for the design). This machine is capable of finding a secret DES
key in an average of four days. In January 1999 a team led by the Electronic
Frontier Foundation won the RSA Laboratories’ Challenge (pocketing USD 10 000 for
their efforts) by managing, with the aid of a large computer network, to break a
56-bit key in 23 hours 15 minutes. This has both political and diplomatic
implications: it appears that it is now financially feasible for all nations to
decode all DES-encoded records that may have been built up over the years. From
now on all DES-based systems should therefore be considered insecure. In
practice, it is now advisable to use Triple-DES at the very least (though even
here caution is needed). The NIST (National Institute for Standards and
Technology), mindful of the risks relating to DES, has called on the
cryptographic community to work on its successor – AES (Advanced Encryption
Standard [24]).
4.5 AES. The required features for AES are: a) the algorithm should be a
secret-key Block Cipher type algorithm, and (b) it should support the following
combinations of cryptographic key-block sizes: 128-128, 192-128 and 256-128 bits.
The algorithms used in AES will be royalty-free worldwide. The algorithm should
also be sufficiently flexible, for example, to allow other combinations (64-bit
block lengths); it should be efficient on various platforms and in various
applications (8-bit processors, ATM networks, satellite communications,
HDTV, B-ISDN, etc.) and it should be usable as a Stream Cipher, MAC (Message
Authentication Code) generator, Pseudo-Random Number Generator, etc.
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At present, it seems that the DEAL, LOK197, FROG, MAGENTA and MARS (in the extra-
long key version) proposals are subject to attacks of varying intensity.
The second AES conference will be held in Rome on 22-23 March 1999, after which
five algorithms will be chosen out of the 15 candidates. The debate on the 15
candidates has already begun ([3]). A third AES conference will be held from six
to nine months later, when the winner will be announced. Following a final
examination period of another six to nine months, the winning algorithm will be
put forward as an FIPS. It is likely that AES will become an FIPS in around 2001.
5. Public-key cryptography
5.1 A description of public-key cryptography. The security of public-key
algorithms has a mathematical basis:
• Factoring of large integers: RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) and Rabin-Williams.
• Discrete Log Problem: DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm), Diffie-Hellman key
exchange, El Gamal cryptosystem and electronic signature and Schnorr and
Nyberg-Rueppel electronic signatures.
• Discrete Log Problem for elliptic curves: the above algorithm equivalents
also apply to elliptic curves. Given an elliptic curve E defined over a
finite field Fp or F2n, it is essential to be able to rapidly calculate the
number of rational points on the elliptic curve over the finite field in
question. The Schoof-Elkies-Atkin method (now known as SEA) is normally used
for this purpose. In some cases (Koblitz curves or complex multiplication
curves) this number is very easy to calculate.
Public-key cryptosystems are prone to attacks:
• Factoring of large integers: the ECM (Elliptic Curve Factoring Method) is
used to find small factors. At present QFS (Quadratic Field Sieve) or NFS
(Number Field Sieve) are used to find large factors. There is a limit to the
numbers that can be considered. Very recently, Professor Shamir of the
Weizmann Institute perfected an approach known as the ‘Twinkle Attack’ which
enables 512-bit numbers to be factored with great rapidity. The cost of the
attack is also very modest. At present, therefore, RSA-512 bits should no
longer be considered secure.
• Discrete Log Problem: to solve this problem, the index-calculus method or the
NFS method can be used. There is a limit to the numbers that can be
considered.
• Discrete Log Problem for elliptic curves: a well-known attack is Pollard’s
rho method (which can also be parallelised). Here too, only certain curves
can be considered: the so-called supersingular or anomalous elliptic curves
should be avoided (a very rapid practical test can show whether a given
elliptic curve is suitable).
The techniques based on the problem of factoring, on the one hand, and the
discrete logarithm, on the other, are fundamentally different. For the former,
large prime numbers have to be secretly produced and stored. As it is not humanly
possible to remember large prime numbers, they have to be stored on a physical
medium, which could give rise to security problems.
The approach to the discrete logarithm problem is different. For example, the
user can freely choose a text that is easy to memorise (e.g. a poem). The text is
then translated into binary code and hashed with a tried-and-tested hash
function, such as the European proposal RIPEMD160, which has an output of 160
bits (see. 3.1). These 160 bits, being impossible to memorise, form the user’s
secret key. This approach has the advantage of limiting storage problems.
These two approaches solve different problems, according to the parameters
involved. Elliptic curve-based techniques are now the focus of attention, since
unlike other proposals, no subexponential algorithm has as yet been discovered to
resolve the discrete logarithm problem for these groups. Consequently, elliptic
curves over fixed-size fields provide the same degree of security as other
algorithms for fields or modules of a larger size. For example, the security
provided by elliptic curves for a 163-bit module is equivalent to that provided
by RSA for 1024 bits.
5.2 Symmetric or public-key cryptography? Symmetric and public-key cryptosystems
are not mutually exclusive . On the contrary, for the secure transmission of a
document through an open channel (e.g. Internet), they are most useful if
combined.
For example, Alice lives in Paris and wishes to send a 15-page report by e-mail
to Bob, who lives in Brussels. It is out of the question for Alice to go to
Brussels to give a secret AES key to Bob. If she were to choose this expensive
method, she might just as well deliver the document in person! Naturally, Alice
and Bob could choose to communicate using public-key cryptographic techniques, as
described above, the only problem being that encryption with these techniques is
about 1000 times slower than encryption using secret-key cryptosystems.
The most practical solution could be the following:
• Alice sends a 128-bit message K to Bob using public-key cryptography. The use
of public-key techniques is warranted, as the message is very short (128
bits). Alice and Bob thus share the secret K.
• As agreed between them according to standard practice, K is the secret key to
a secret-key algorithm, AES.
• Alice and Bob forget the public-key technology. To continue communicating
they use AES with the K key. Alice can now send her 15-page document to Bob
for the price of a phone call.
Alice’s and Bob’s systems must, however, be compatible: indeed, the aim of the
standardisation drive described below is to harmonise communications.
5.3 IEEE-P1363 and other standards. The P1363 project began in 1993 under the
auspices of the IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers)
Standardisation Committee. Its aim is to improve communications between several
families of public-key cryptosystems: RSA, El Gamal, Diffie-Hellman and elliptic
curves. Since the end of 1996, the techniques considered by P1363 have changed
little and have been summarised in ([16]). The P1363A project contains additional
techniques.
The standard project (draft version 9) is now ready to be revised by a group of
experts from the IEEE Standards Association. The group started its work in
February 1999 and will deliver its initial conclusions on 2 April 1999. According
to the most optimistic estimate, the draft will be approved as a standard on 25
June 1999.
The IEEE-P1363 standard will have a huge influence on other standards, such as
ANSI X9.42, ANSI X9.62 and ANSI X9.63 in the banking industry. It will also be
the cornerstone of the X.509 ([17]) and S-MIME ([18]) protocols. These multiple
protocols are essential for
electronic commerce.
5.4 A technical interpretation of the Commission (DG XIII) document COM(97) 503.
This document [12] sets out Community-wide requirements with regard to secure
electronic communications. It focuses on both electronic signatures and
confidential methods of electronic communication. Below we suggest a few updates
to Technical Annexes I (Digital Signature) and II (Symmetric and asymmetric
encryption) to this document.
Annex I. It would be preferable to avoid citing MD2 and MD5 as examples, since
cases of collision in the former and pseudo-collision in the latter have been
brought to light. It would also be advisable to replace SHA by SHA-1 (based on
[14]) and to write RIPEMD-160 (based on [7]) instead of RIPEM 160. It is
currently recommended that one of these two hash functions be used to replace the
MD2, MD4 and MD5 functions wherever possible.
Annex II. Symmetric encryption systems. It would be preferable to avoid citing
DES and SAFER as examples. We suggest that IDEA, which so far has shown no
serious flaws, be retained and that the candidates that passed the first AES
round be mentioned.
Annex II. Asymmetric encryption systems. Once again, as regards the examples
provided, it would be advisable to be more specific, e.g. by taking up the
approach described at the start of 5.1, which is currently being standardised.
Annexe II. Systems security. We suggest deleting the last sentence of the second
paragraph: ‘In a symmetric system like DES or IDEA, keys of 56 to 128 bits
provide similar protection as a 1024-bit public key’. This assertion is totally
false.
6. Quantum cryptanalysis and quantum cryptography
Quantum cryptanalysis and quantum cryptography may have a considerable impact in
the political, diplomatic and financial terms.
6.1 Quantum cryptanalysis. The term quantum cryptanalysis refers to the set of
techniques whereby the secret keys of cryptographic protocols can be found by
means of quantum computers. It is an area in which research is thriving, as in
August 1998 one of the system’s founders, Peter Shor of AT & T Bell Labs, won the
Nevanlinna Prize, which was awarded to him at the International Congress of
Mathematicians in Berlin. He has developed methods based on quantum physics to
factor large numbers in polynomial time ([29], [30]) or to solve the Discrete Log
Problem even when formulated within the general context of Abelian varieties
([31], see [32] for a summary of these results).
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ΥΗΟ∆ΩΛΘϑ ΩΡ ΩΚΗ :∆ςςΗΘ∆∆Υ ∃ΥΥ∆ΘϑΗΠΗΘΩ. 
∋ΗςΣΛΩΗ ΩΚΛς, ,(((-31363 Λς ςΩΛΟΟ Ψ∆ΟΛΓ: ΩΚΗ 6ΚΡΥ ∆ΟϑΡΥΛΩΚΠς ΥΗΤΞΛΥΗ ∆ ΣΡΖΗΥΙΞΟ ΤΞ∆ΘΩΞΠ ΦΡΠΣΞΩΗΥ, 
ΖΚΡςΗ Η[ΛςΩΗΘΦΗ Λς ςΩΛΟΟ Κ∴ΣΡΩΚΗΩΛΦ∆Ο. 9∆ΥΛΡΞς Η[ΣΗΥΛΠΗΘΩ∆Ο ΣΥΡΣΡς∆Ος Κ∆ΨΗ ΕΗΗΘ Π∆ΓΗ (ΤΞΕΛΩς ∆ΥΗ ΩΚΗ 
ΤΞ∆ΘΩΞΠ ΗΤΞΛΨ∆ΟΗΘΩ ΡΙ ΕΛΩς ∆ΘΓ ∆ΥΗ Ε∆ςΛΦ∆ΟΟ∴ ΓΞ∆Ο-ςΩ∆ΩΗ ΤΞ∆ΘΩΞΠ ς∴ςΩΗΠς): 
• 7Ρ ΞςΗ ΩΚΗ ΗΟΗΦΩΥΡΘΛΦ ςΩ∆ΩΗς ΡΙ ΛΡΘς ∆ς ΤΞΕΛΩς ΛΘ ∆Θ ΗΟΗΦΩΥΡΠ∆ϑΘΗΩΛΦ ΛΡΘ ΩΥ∆Σ ∆ΘΓ ΩΡ Π∆ΘΛΣΞΟ∆ΩΗ 
ΩΚΗΠ ΖΛΩΚ Ο∆ςΗΥς (ςΗΗ >4≅). 
• 7Ρ ΞςΗ ΘΞΦΟΗ∆Υ ∆ΩΡΠ ςΣΛΘς ΛΘ ∆ ΦΡΠΣΟΗ[ ΠΡΟΗΦΞΟΗ ∆ς ΤΞΕΛΩς, ∆ΘΓ ΩΡ Π∆ΘΛΣΞΟ∆ΩΗ ΩΚΗΠ ΞςΛΘϑ 
ΘΞΦΟΗ∆Υ Π∆ϑΘΗΩΛΦ ΥΗςΡΘ∆ΘΦΗ (ςΗΗ >6≅ ∆ΘΓ >9≅). 
• 7Ρ ΞςΗ ΩΚΗ ΘΞΦΟΗ∆Υ ςΣΛΘς ΡΙ ςΛΟΛΦΡΘ ΦΚΛΣ ΛΠΣΞΥΛΩΛΗς ∆ς ΤΞΕΛΩς ∆ΘΓ ΩΡ Π∆ΘΛΣΞΟ∆ΩΗ ΩΚΗΠ ΞςΛΘϑ ΩΚΗ 
ΦΚΛΣ∂ς ΗΟΗΦΩΥΡΘΛΦς (ςΗΗ >19≅). 
1ΡΘΗ ΡΙ ΩΚΗςΗ ΣΥΡΣΡς∆Ος Κ∆ς ΕΗΗΘ ΩΗςΩΗΓ ΙΡΥ ∆Θ∴ΩΚΛΘϑ ΡΩΚΗΥ ΩΚ∆Θ ςΠ∆ΟΟ ΘΞΠΕΗΥς ΡΙ ΤΞΕΛΩς. 
7ΚΛς ΙΛΗΟΓ ΡΙ ΥΗςΗ∆ΥΦΚ Λς Σ∆ΥΩΛΦΞΟ∆ΥΟ∴ ΖΗΟΟ-ΥΗϑ∆ΥΓΗΓ ΛΘ ΩΚΗ 8ΘΛΩΗΓ 6Ω∆ΩΗς ∆ΘΓ Λς ΙΞΘΓΗΓ Ε∴ ΩΚΗ ∋∃53∃, 
ΩΚΗ 3ΗΘΩ∆ϑΡΘ∂ς ΥΗςΗ∆ΥΦΚ ΓΗΣ∆ΥΩΠΗΘΩ. ∃ ςΛΠΛΟ∆Υ ΣΥΡΜΗΦΩ Κ∆ς ΕΗΗΘ ςΗΩ ΞΣ ΛΘ (ΞΥΡΣΗ: ΘΛΘΗ ΥΗςΗ∆ΥΦΚ 
ϑΥΡΞΣς Κ∆ΨΗ ΜΡΛΘΗΓ ΩΡϑΗΩΚΗΥ ΩΡ ΙΡΥΠ ΩΚΗ 4Ξ∆ΘΩΞΠ ,ΘΙΡΥΠ∆ΩΛΡΘ (ΞΥΡΣΗ∆Θ 5ΗςΗ∆ΥΦΚ 1ΗΩΖΡΥΝ. 
1ΡΘΗΩΚΗΟΗςς, ∆ΦΦΡΥΓΛΘϑ ΩΡ 6ΚΡΥ (>31≅) ΛΩ ΖΡΞΟΓ ΕΗ ΞΘΥΗ∆ςΡΘ∆ΕΟΗ ΩΡ Η[ΣΗΦΩ ∆ ΤΞ∆ΘΩΞΠ ΦΡΣΥΡΦΗςςΡΥ ΩΡ 
ΕΗ ΓΗΨΗΟΡΣΗΓ ΖΛΩΚΛΘ ΩΚΗ ΘΗ[Ω ΙΗΖ ∴Η∆Υς. 
6ΚΡΞΟΓ ςΞΦΚ ∆ ΤΞ∆ΘΩΞΠ ΦΡΠΣΞΩΗΥ ΗΨΗΥ Η[ΛςΩ, ΩΚΗ ΣΞΕΟΛΦ-ΝΗ∴ ΦΥ∴ΣΩΡϑΥ∆ΣΚ∴ ΓΗςΦΥΛΕΗΓ ΛΘ 6ΗΦΩΛΡΘ 5 
ΖΡΞΟΓ ΕΗΦΡΠΗ ΡΕςΡΟΗΩΗ. 1ΗΨΗΥΩΚΗΟΗςς, ΩΚΗΥΗ Λς ∆ ΩΚΗΡΥ∴ ΡΙ ΤΞ∆ΘΩΞΠ ΦΥ∴ΣΩΡϑΥ∆ΣΚ∴, ΠΡΥΗ ςΣΗΦΛΙΛΦ∆ΟΟ∴ 
ΡΙ ΤΞ∆ΘΩΞΠ ΝΗ∴-ςΚ∆ΥΛΘϑ (>1≅, ςΗΗ >2≅ ΙΡΥ ∆ ΕΛΕΟΛΡϑΥ∆ΣΚ∴ ΡΘ ΩΚΗ ςΞΕΜΗΦΩ), ΖΚΛΦΚ ΡΙΙΗΥς ∆Θ ∆ΟΩΗΥΘ∆ΩΛΨΗ ΩΡ 
ΣΞΕΟΛΦ-ΝΗ∴ ΦΥ∴ΣΩΡϑΥ∆ΣΚ∴. 
 
6.2 4Ξ∆ΘΩΞΠ ΦΥ∴ΣΩΡϑΥ∆ΣΚ∴. 7ΚΗ ΣΥΡΕΟΗΠς ∆ΥΗ ςΛΠΛΟ∆Υ ΩΡ ΩΚΡςΗ ΓΗςΦΥΛΕΗΓ ΛΘ 5.2: ∃ΟΛΦΗ ∆ΘΓ %ΡΕ 
ΡΘΦΗ ∆ϑ∆ΛΘ ΖΛςΚ ΩΡ ςΚ∆ΥΗ ∆ ςΗΦΥΗΩ, ΖΚΛΦΚ ΩΚΗ∴ Φ∆Θ ΩΚΗΘ ΞςΗ ∆ς ∆ ςΗΦΥΗΩ ΝΗ∴ ΙΡΥ ∆ ς∴ΠΠΗΩΥΛΦ ΣΥΡΩΡΦΡΟ 
(ςΞΦΚ ∆ς ∃(6). ,Ι ΩΚΗ∴ ΞςΗ ΡΘΟ∴ ∆ ΩΗΟΗΣΚΡΘΗ ΟΛΘΗ, ΩΚΗ∴ Κ∆ΨΗ ΘΡ ΦΚΡΛΦΗ ΕΞΩ ΩΡ ΗΠΣΟΡ∴ ΣΞΕΟΛΦ-ΝΗ∴ 
ΦΥ∴ΣΩΡϑΥ∆ΣΚ∴. ,Ι ∆Θ ∆ΩΩ∆ΦΝΗΥ ΖΛΩΚ ∆ ΣΡΖΗΥΙΞΟ ΤΞ∆ΘΩΞΠ ΦΡΠΣΞΩΗΥ Η∆ΨΗςΓΥΡΣς ΡΘ ΩΚΗΛΥ ΦΡΘΨΗΥς∆ΩΛΡΘ, 
ΩΚΗ∴ ∆ΥΗ ΡΣΗΘ ΩΡ ΩΚΗ ∆ΩΩ∆ΦΝς ΓΗςΦΥΛΕΗΓ Η∆ΥΟΛΗΥ. +ΡΖΗΨΗΥ, ΛΙ ΩΚΗ∴ Φ∆Θ ΞςΗ ∆Θ ΡΣΩΛΦ∆Ο ΙΛΕΥΗ ΩΡ ΩΥ∆ΘςΠΛΩ 
ΤΞ∆ΘΩΞΠ ςΩ∆ΩΗς, ΩΚΗ∴ Φ∆Θ ΗΠΣΟΡ∴ ΤΞ∆ΘΩΞΠ ΦΥ∴ΣΩΡϑΥ∆ΣΚ∴. ,Ω Φ∆Θ ΕΗ ΓΗςΛϑΘΗΓ ΛΘ ςΞΦΚ ∆ Ζ∆∴ ΩΚ∆Ω ∆Θ 
∆ΩΩ∆ΦΝΗΥ ΟΛςΩΗΘΛΘϑ ΛΘ ΡΘ ΩΚΗ ΦΡΘΨΗΥς∆ΩΛΡΘ Φ∆Θ Φ∆ΣΩΞΥΗ ΡΘΟ∴ ΡΘΗ ∝ΕΛΩ∂ ΡΙ ΩΚΗ ΦΡΘΨΗΥς∆ΩΛΡΘ ∆Ω ΩΚΗ ΠΡςΩ. 
)ΞΥΩΚΗΥΠΡΥΗ, ∆Θ∴ ΛΘΙΡΥΠ∆ΩΛΡΘ ΩΚ∆Ω ΚΗ ΓΡΗς Π∆Θ∆ϑΗ ΩΡ Φ∆ΣΩΞΥΗ ΖΛΟΟ ΓΛςΩΞΥΕ ΩΚΗ ςΩ∆ΩΗς, ςΡ ∃ΟΛΦΗ ∆ΘΓ 
%ΡΕ ΖΛΟΟ ΛΠΠΗΓΛ∆ΩΗΟ∴ ΝΘΡΖ ΖΚ∆Ω Λς Κ∆ΣΣΗΘΛΘϑ. ∃ΟΟ ΩΚΗ∴ ΖΡΞΟΓ ΩΚΗΘ Κ∆ΨΗ ΩΡ ΓΡ ΩΚΗΘ Λς ΥΗΜΗΦΩ ΩΚΗ 
ςΩ∆ΩΗς ΛΘ ΤΞΗςΩΛΡΘ. 
Although the theory dates back to 1982-84 ([1]), it was not put into practice
until the 1990s. In 1990-92 IBM began an initial free-space experiment over a 30
cm length. In 1993-95 British Telecom conducted an experiment on optical fibres
over a 10-30 km length. In 1996 Swiss Telekom conducted similar experiments on a
23 km fibre under Lake Leman. In 1997 Los Alamos National Lab successfully
conducted the same experiments on a 48 km optical fibre, and in 1998 it conducted
an experiment through free space over 1 km.
7. A technical interpretation of Category 5 of the Wassenaar Arrangement
 
7.1 7ΚΗ :∆ςςΗΘ∆∆Υ ∃ΥΥ∆ΘϑΗΠΗΘΩ. ∃ΦΝΘΡΖΟΗΓϑΛΘϑ ΩΚΗ ΗΘΓ ΡΙ ΩΚΗ &ΡΟΓ :∆Υ, ΡΘ 16 1ΡΨΗΠΕΗΥ 1993 
ΛΘ 7ΚΗ +∆ϑΞΗ ΥΗΣΥΗςΗΘΩ∆ΩΛΨΗς ΡΙ ΩΚΗ 17 ΠΗΠΕΗΥ ςΩ∆ΩΗς ΡΙ &2&20 ΓΗΦΛΓΗΓ ΩΡ ∆ΕΡΟΛςΚ ΩΚΗ ΦΡΠΠΛΩΩΗΗ 
∆ΘΓ ΥΗΣΟ∆ΦΗ ΛΩ ΖΛΩΚ ∆ ΕΡΓ∴ ΖΚΛΦΚ ΥΗΙΟΗΦΩΗΓ ΩΚΗ ΘΗΖ ΣΡΟΛΩΛΦ∆Ο ΓΗΨΗΟΡΣΠΗΘΩς. 7ΚΗ ΓΗΦΛςΛΡΘ ΩΡ ΖΛΘΓ ΞΣ 
&2&20 Ζ∆ς ΦΡΘΙΛΥΠΗΓ ΛΘ :∆ςςΗΘ∆∆Υ (1ΗΩΚΗΥΟ∆ΘΓς) ΡΘ 29-30 0∆ΥΦΚ 1994 ∆ΘΓ Φ∆ΠΗ ΛΘΩΡ ΗΙΙΗΦΩ ΡΘ 
31 0∆ΥΦΚ 1994. 
7ΚΗ ΙΡΞΘΓ∆ΩΛΡΘς ΡΙ ΩΚΗ ∆ϑΥΗΗΠΗΘΩ ΡΘ &2&20∂ς ςΞΦΦΗςςΡΥ ΖΗΥΗ Ο∆ΛΓ ΡΘ 19 ∋ΗΦΗΠΕΗΥ 1995, ΡΘΦΗ 
∆ϑ∆ΛΘ ΛΘ :∆ςςΗΘ∆∆Υ, ∆ΘΓ ΩΚΗ ΛΘ∆ΞϑΞΥ∆Ο ΠΗΗΩΛΘϑ Ζ∆ς ΚΗΟΓ ΡΘ 2-3 ∃ΣΥΛΟ 1996 ΛΘ 9ΛΗΘΘ∆, ΖΚΛΦΚ ςΛΘΦΗ 
ΩΚΗΘ Κ∆ς ΕΗΦΡΠΗ ΩΚΗ ςΛΩΗ ΡΙ ΩΚΗ 3ΗΥΠ∆ΘΗΘΩ 5ΗΣΥΗςΗΘΩ∆ΩΛΡΘ ΡΙ ΩΚΗ :∆ςςΗΘ∆∆Υ ∃ϑΥΗΗΠΗΘΩς. 
7ΚΗ ∃ΥΥ∆ΘϑΗΠΗΘΩ ΦΡΘΦΗΥΘς Η[ΣΡΥΩ ΦΡΘΩΥΡΟς ΙΡΥ ΦΡΘΨΗΘΩΛΡΘ∆Ο ∆ΥΠς ∆ΘΓ ςΗΘςΛΩΛΨΗ ΩΗΦΚΘΡΟΡϑΛΦ∆Ο 
ΣΥΡΓΞΦΩς. 3∆ΥΩΛΦΛΣ∆ΩΛΘϑ ΦΡΞΘΩΥΛΗς ∆ΥΗ: ∗ΗΥΠ∆Θ∴, ∃ΥϑΗΘΩΛΘ∆, ∃ΞςΩΥ∆ΟΛ∆, ∃ΞςΩΥΛ∆, %ΗΟϑΛΞΠ, %ΞΟϑ∆ΥΛ∆, 
&∆Θ∆Γ∆, ∋ΗΘΠ∆ΥΝ, 8ΘΛΩΗΓ 6Ω∆ΩΗς, 5ΞςςΛ∆Θ )ΗΓΗΥ∆ΩΛΡΘ, )ΛΘΟ∆ΘΓ, )Υ∆ΘΦΗ, 6Σ∆ΛΘ, ∗ΥΗΗΦΗ, +ΞΘϑ∆Υ∴, 
,ΥΗΟ∆ΘΓ, ,Ω∆Ο∴, −∆Σ∆Θ, /Ξ[ΗΠΕΡΞΥϑ, 1ΡΥΖ∆∴, 1ΗΖ =Η∆Ο∆ΘΓ, ΩΚΗ 1ΗΩΚΗΥΟ∆ΘΓς, 3ΡΟ∆ΘΓ, 3ΡΥΩΞϑ∆Ο, 
5ΗΣΞΕΟΛΦ ΡΙ .ΡΥΗ∆, 6ΟΡΨ∆Ν 5ΗΣΞΕΟΛΦ, &]ΗΦΚ 5ΗΣΞΕΟΛΦ, 5ΡΠ∆ΘΛ∆, 8ΘΛΩΗΓ .ΛΘϑΓΡΠ, 6ΖΗΓΗΘ, 
6ΖΛΩ]ΗΥΟ∆ΘΓ, 7ΞΥΝΗ∴ ∆ΘΓ 8ΝΥ∆ΛΘΗ.  
7ΚΛς ΟΛςΩ ΡΙ 33 ΦΡΞΘΩΥΛΗς ΛΘΦΟΞΓΗς, ΛΘ Σ∆ΥΩΛΦΞΟ∆Υ, ΩΚΡςΗ ΡΙ ΩΚΗ (ΞΥΡΣΗ∆Θ &ΡΠΠΞΘΛΩ∴ ∆ΘΓ ΩΚΗ ςΛϑΘ∆ΩΡΥΛΗς 
ΩΡ ΩΚΗ 8.86∃ ∆ϑΥΗΗΠΗΘΩ. 
7ΚΗ ∃ΥΥ∆ΘϑΗΠΗΘΩ Λς ΡΣΗΘ ΩΡ ΩΚΡςΗ ΦΡΞΘΩΥΛΗς ΖΚΛΦΚ ΙΞΟΙΛΟ ΦΗΥΩ∆ΛΘ ΦΥΛΩΗΥΛ∆ (ςΗΗ >34≅ ΙΡΥ ∆ ΙΞΟΟ 
ΓΗςΦΥΛΣΩΛΡΘ) ∆ΘΓ ΓΗΦΛςΛΡΘς ∆ΥΗ Ε∆ςΗΓ ΡΘ ΦΡΘςΗΘςΞς. 2ΕςΗΥΨΗΥς ∆ΥΗ ΘΡΩ ∆ΓΠΛΩΩΗΓ. 
∃ς ΥΗϑ∆ΥΓς ΩΚΗ ςΗΦΞΥΛΩ∴ ΡΙ ΛΘΙΡΥΠ∆ΩΛΡΘ, ςΡΠΗ ΛΠΣΡΥΩ∆ΘΩ ∆ΠΗΘΓΠΗΘΩς ΖΗΥΗ Π∆ΓΗ ΓΞΥΛΘϑ ΩΚΗ Ο∆ςΩ 
ΠΗΗΩΛΘϑ ΡΙ ΩΚΗ ΥΗΣΥΗςΗΘΩ∆ΩΛΨΗς ΡΙ ΩΚΗ ςΛϑΘ∆ΩΡΥ∴ ΦΡΞΘΩΥΛΗς ΩΡ ΩΚΗ ∃ΥΥ∆ΘϑΗΠΗΘΩ ΡΘ 2-3 ∋ΗΦΗΠΕΗΥ 1998 
ΛΘ 9ΛΗΘΘ∆ (>34≅). 7ΚΗςΗ ∆ΠΗΘΓΠΗΘΩς, ΡΙ ΖΚΛΦΚ ΖΗ ϑΛΨΗ ∆ ΩΗΦΚΘΛΦ∆Ο ΛΘΩΗΥΣΥΗΩ∆ΩΛΡΘ ΕΗΟΡΖ, ΦΡΘΦΗΥΘ 
&∆ΩΗϑΡΥ∴ 5, Σ∆ΥΩ 2, ΗΘΩΛΩΟΗΓ ,ΘΙΡΥΠ∆ΩΛΡΘ 6ΗΦΞΥΛΩ∴. 
 
7.2 &∆ΩΗϑΡΥ∴ 5, Σ∆ΥΩ 2: ,ΘΙΡΥΠ∆ΩΛΡΘ 6ΗΦΞΥΛΩ∴. 3∆ΥΩ 5.∃.2 ςΩΛΣΞΟ∆ΩΗς ΛΘ Σ∆ΥΩΛΦΞΟ∆Υ ΩΚ∆Ω ΦΡΘΩΥΡΟς ∆ΥΗ ΩΡ 
ΕΗ ΛΠΣΡςΗΓ ΡΘ ς∴ςΩΗΠς, ΗΤΞΛΣΠΗΘΩ ∆ΘΓ ΦΡΠΣΡΘΗΘΩς ΞςΛΘϑ ΩΚΗ ΙΡΟΟΡΖΛΘϑ (ΗΛΩΚΗΥ ΓΛΥΗΦΩΟ∴ ΡΥ ∆ΙΩΗΥ 
ΠΡΓΛΙΛΦ∆ΩΛΡΘ): 
1. ∆ ς∴ΠΠΗΩΥΛΦ ∆ΟϑΡΥΛΩΚΠ ΞςΛΘϑ ∆ ΝΗ∴ ΟΡΘϑΗΥ ΩΚ∆Θ 56 ΕΛΩς; ΡΥ 
2. ∆ ΣΞΕΟΛΦ-ΝΗ∴ ∆ΟϑΡΥΛΩΚΠ, ΛΘ ΖΚΛΦΚ ΩΚΗ ςΗΦΞΥΛΩ∴ ΡΙ ΩΚΗ ∆ΟϑΡΥΛΩΚΠ Λς Ε∆ςΗΓ ΡΘ ΡΘΗ ΡΙ ΩΚΗ ΙΡΟΟΡΖΛΘϑ: 
 (∆) ΩΚΗ Ι∆ΦΩΡΥΛς∆ΩΛΡΘ ΡΙ ΛΘΩΗϑΗΥς ΚΛϑΚΗΥ ΩΚ∆Θ 512 ΕΛΩς (Η.ϑ. 56∃); 
(b) discrete log computations in the multiplicative group of a finite
field larger than 512 bits;
(c) discrete log computations in a group other than those mentioned above,
and which is larger than 112 bits.
However (Note 5.A.2.d), cryptographic equipment specially designed and intended
solely for use in machines for banking or money transactions is not subject to
controls.
7.3 Comments. The gist of Point (1) is that unrestricted exports are authorised
only for those techniques which offer the same degree of security as DES. As
explained in 4.3, this type of system offers a very limited degree of security.
The techniques referred to in Point (2) were illustrated in 5.1. The main groups
targeted in (2c) are those associated with elliptic curves. However, in actual
fact (2c) covers a far vaster area, as it concerns all groups. It thus includes,
inter alia, rational points of Abelian varieties over a fnite field (in
particular elliptic curves, which are Abelian varieties of dimension 1), which
are known (see 6.1) to be open to quantum cryptanalysis.
As stated in 5.1, according to current know-how elliptic curves over fixed-size
fields offer equivalent security to that provided by RSA with far larger modules
or with the discrete logarithm over a far larger finite field. In other words,
(2a), (2b) and (2c) offer equivalent degrees of security, in that, on average,
more or less the same effort is required to recover the secret data from the
different algorithms. This explains the slight difference in size between (2a,
2b) and (2c). Moreover, as seen in 5.2, these public-key techniques are generally
combined with secret-key cryptosystems.
7.4 Note. Watermark techniques are not included in the systems subject to
controls. Such techniques, which are also known as data hiding or steganography,
enable one piece of information to be hidden in another, e.g. a fax, photo, video
or sound files. The hidden information generally protects the intellectual
ownership of the data (see [20]), but nothing prevents users from hiding other
things, such as a 128-bit key for a symmetric system, which the two
correspondents have agreed on in advance (possibly via information that has been
embedded in another document using a stenographic method). The state of the art
is that documents which contain information hidden using steganographic
techniques cannot – without special software - be distinguished from the
original; moreover, the information can withstand numerous
compressions/decompressions (necessary for the rapid transmission of such
documents over the Internet) and can only be recovered by means of a special
software product and a password. This technique is also very cheap. It seems that
it is not therefore subject to export restrictions, but in practice it does allow
confidential data to be exchanged. Likewise, the approach entitled ‘Chaffing and
Winnowing: Confidentiality without Encryption’, developed by Professor Rivest,
also enables a high degree of confidentiality to be achieved, whilst avoiding any
entanglement with the Wassenaar Arrangement.
7.5 Impact on criminal organisations. It would be naïve to imagine that criminal
or terrorist organisations conduct their business in compliance with
international import/export rules, or that they do not have not the means to
perfect highly confidential methods of communication. Algorithms do not stop at
borders. Moreover, numerous algorithms are freely accessible. It is also
difficult to see how the authorities could prove that a suspect binary sequence
was created using an unauthorised system if, for example, it was actually created
with a public-key cryptosystem using a 4096-bit module. Just because an
intercepted binary sequence does not make sense, even if it has hypothetically
used a ‘lawful’ cryptographic system (which can be ascertained, but at
considerable cost), this does not mean that it has been created ‘unlawfully’
(which, above a certain level of sophistication, cannot be ascertained). Lastly,
even if cryptographic products are subject to tight export controls, the fact
remains that they are still freely used in many countries, including the United
States. However, it does not appear that criminal or terrorist organisations
operate only outside these countries; but neither do the authorities of these
countries appear to lack effective means of investigation on their national
territory.
7.6 Impact on the European Union. From a Community point of view, the
consequences of the Wassenaar amendments are manifold.
Prior to the amendments, EU firms were free to conquer the data security market
as long as the laws of their country of origin authorised them to do so. In
particular, European firms in this sector could export solutions with a very high
degree of security, the only restrictions being those imposed by national
legislation (which could nevertheless be extremely tight, as in the case of
France until recently).
Now, however, the only products that European data security firms are allowed to
export without restriction are of a far lower quality.
By virtue of these amendments, at the time of publication of the agreement
European data security firms, unlike their US counterparts, could not
automatically realise economies of scale and target large markets. Even if, from
the viewpoint of the Wassenaar Arrangement, they were on an equal footing with US
firms, this apparent equality was deceptive and overall they were at a
disadvantage.
Fortunately, bilateral agreements reached in Europe now allow European firms to
sell high-quality solutions freely throughout the continent. However, this
freedom ends abruptly at Europe’s external borders.
But even if the use of cryptography is such as to prevent industrial espionage by
bodies with limited financial clout, the Wassenaar Arrangement resolutions do not
protect firms from all risks. In the light of the existence of the DES Cracker,
it is not unreasonable to estimate that an institution with a USD 300 million
budget could recover a 56-bit key within a few seconds. With the same budget, it
would take a few tenthousandths of a second (see 2.4, where this is the maximum
level of security provided by several GSM cellphones) to find a secret 40-bit
key. Hence those firms, bodies or individuals that equip themselves with a
cryptosystem which fulfils the criteria set out in 7.2 should be fully aware that
the Echelon network is in all likelihood still able to intercept and decode their
information.
8. Recommendations
It is our view that the recommendations (Section 4.5, p. 21-22) contained in the
previous report [35] are still valid. Here, however, we seek to provide the
European Parliament with some alternative solutions.
A.- Experts should be commissioned to provide updates on a regular basis,
or as required, to the technical documents published by Community bodies.
For example, it would be advisable to examine whether and to what extent
the comments made in 5.4 (which are by no means exhaustive) have been
taken into consideration; it would also be advisable to monitor the
conferences on AES, IEEE-P1363 and P1363A concerning secret-key and
public-key cryptography and the experimental developments with regard to
quantum processors.
B. – Bearing in mind the legal risks run by European telephone industries
(groups of users could be roused to action by the fact that the level of
security provided does not systematically correspond to the level
claimed), European bodies should encourage European telephone operators
to:
- update their implementation of the COMP128 authentication
algorithm;
- clearly specify the actual level of security of their
implementation of the encryption algorithm A5.
C – In view of the fact that the NSA has managed to bring about a
considerable reduction in the degree of security offered to non-US users
of solutions developed by Microsoft, Netscape and Lotus for encrypting
electronic messages, with the express intention of being systematically
able to read the messages exchanged by these users (and probably being the
only agency in the world able to do so), the European Parliament should
actively promote the use, amongst European organisations, firms and
citizens, of e-mail encrypting solutions that actually provide the
confidentiality promised. At the same time, Proposal 5 of the ‘Policy
issues for the European Parliament’ contained in the STOA IC 2000 report
by Duncan Campbell should be taken into consideration.
D. – In view of:
- the launch of the worldwide advertising campaign for the PSN*-
equipped Pentium III by the market leader (80%+) for PC chips,
- the risks of the PSN being used for electronic surveillance
purposes,
- the concern shown by the highest US authorities with regard to
this precise subject (see the declaration [15] made on 25 January
1999 by Mr Al Gore, Vice-President of the United States),
- the risk that PSNs may be cloned and be unsuitable for e-commerce,
hence the risk that this new industry may be held back, particularly
in Europe,
the relevant committees of the European Parliament should:
- call on American government agencies, including the NSA and FBI,
to provide information on their role in the creation of the PSN
developed by Intel,
- at the same time commission a group of independent technical
experts to conduct a precise assessment of the risks connected to
this product: electronic surveillance, PSN falsification, etc. The
group should issue its report as soon as possible.
Building on the initial results of the above, if appropriate, the relevant
committees of the European Parliament, should be asked to consider legal measures
to prevent PSN-equipped (or PSN-equivalent) chips from being installed in the
computers of European citizens, firms and organisations. We wish to underline
most strongly that the above suggestions have no connection whatsoever with any
particular firm, but are motivated purely by the characteristics of a product
which, unless rapid action is taken at Community level, may become a de facto
industrial standard in Europe within the next few months.
E. – As regards Category 5, Part 2 of the Wassenaar Arrangement, dealt with in
Section 7 of this report, the following should be noted:
- Since high-security secret-key and public-key algorithms are freely
accessible, for example via the Internet, and in view of Note 7.4 and the
implications of such accessibility (see 7.5), it appears that export
restrictions in no way constitute a serious impediment for criminal and
terrorist organisations. Nevertheless, by following the example of the
United States the police can take effective action, even when top-quality
cryptographic products are freely used.
- However, in the light of 7.6, such export restrictions pose a serious
obstacle to European data security firms and hinder the development of the
international
e-commerce industry.
- On 19 January 1999, following the inter-ministerial committee meeting on
the information society ([5]), the French Government, in agreement with
President Chirac, pledged to liberalise the use of cryptography by raising
from 40 bits to 128 bits the security threshold which may be freely used.
This latest development is apparently only the first step towards a total
deregulation of the use of cryptography on French territory. Until then,
French rules on cryptography had been among the most stringent in the
world.
- The Echelon network is most probably able to intercept, decode and
process the information transmitted with products on the market that
fulfil the criteria mentioned in 7.2.
In order to strengthen Community cohesion, the European Parliament should strive
initially to persuade EU countries to adopt a common position at the meetings
organised under the Wassenaar Arrangement. Subsequently, in view of the
aforementioned points, and in order to boost electronic commerce on a worldwide
scale, it should suggest that the Community simply with from Category 5, Part 2
of the list of products subject to controls under the Wassenaar Arrangement.
F. – The committee should commission a more detailed report on the implications
* 3ΥΡΦΗςςΡΥ 6ΗΥΛ∆Ο 1ΞΠΕΗΥ 
of the risks in terms of electronic surveillance that the Wassenaar Arrangement
brings with it. For example, under Item 5.B.1.b.1 (Part 1, on
Telecommunications) certain equipment using ATM (Asynchronous Transfer Mode)
digital techniques is subject to controls. This data transfer technology is far
more difficult (but not impossible, see [32], part 2, and the aforementioned STOA
report by Duncan Campbell) to monitor electronically than conventional TCP/IP
systems. It would also be very useful to ascertain whether products that are
authorised for export provide effective responses to TEMPEST (see 2.7 and
introduction to point 3), since the usefulness of cryptosystems is somewhat
limited if the data can be read in plaintext before encryption or after
decryption, with the aid of electromagnetic radiation.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
%ΛΕΟΛΡϑΥ∆ΣΚΛΗ
 
1 &. +. %ΗΘΘΗΩΩ, ∗. %Υ∆ςς∆ΥΓ : 4Ξ∆ΘΩΞΠ ΦΥ∴ΣΩΡϑΥ∆ΣΚ∴: ΣΞΕΟΛΦ ΝΗ∴ ΓΛςΩΥΛΕΞΩΛΡΘ ∆ΘΓ ΦΡΛΘ ΩΡςςΛΘϑ. ,Θ 3ΥΡΦ. 
,((( ,ΘΩΗΥΘ∆ΩΛΡΘ∆Ο &ΡΘΙΗΥΗΘΦΗ ΡΘ &ΡΠΣΞΩΗΥς, 6∴ςΩΗΠς ∆ΘΓ 6ΛϑΘ∆Ο 3ΥΡΦΗςςΛΘϑ, %∆Θϑ∆ΟΡΥΗ, ,ΘΓΛ∆ (1984). 
 
2 ∗. %Υ∆ςς∆ΥΓ : 4Ξ∆ΘΩΞΠ ΦΥ∴ΣΩΡϑΥ∆ΣΚ∴: ∆ ΕΛΕΟΛΡϑΥ∆ΣΚ∴. 6,∗∃&7 1ΗΖς 24:3 (1993). 8ΘΗ ΨΗΥςΛΡΘ ΣΟΞς 
ΥπΦΗΘΩΗ ΗςΩ ∆ΦΦΗςςΛΕΟΗ ΡΘΟΛΘΗ ϕ ΚΩΩΣ://ΖΖΖ.ΛΥΡ.ΞΠΡΘΩΥΗ∆Ο.Φ∆/ΦΥΗΣΗ∆Ξ/%ΛΕΟΛΡ-4&.ΚΩΠΟ 
 
3 Φ∃(6∆Υ 3ΥΡΜΗΦΩ : ΚΩΩΣ://ΖΖΖ.ΓΛΦΗ.ΞΦΟ.∆Φ.ΕΗ/ΦΥ∴ΣΩΡ/&∃(6∃5/Φ∆Ης∆Υ.ΚΩΠΟ 
 
4 −. ,. &ΛΥΛ∆Φ, 3. =ΡΟΟΗΥ : 4Ξ∆ΘΩΞΠ ΦΡΠΣΞΩ∆ΩΛΡΘς ΖΛΩΚ ΦΡΟΓ ΩΥ∆ΣΣΗΓ ΛΡΘς. 3Κ∴ς. 5ΗΨ. /ΗΩΩ. 74, Σ. 4091-4094 
(1995) 
 
5 &ΡΠΛΩπ ΛΘΩΗΥΠΛΘΛςΩπΥΛΗΟ ΣΡΞΥ Ο∆ ςΡΦΛπΩπ ΓΗ Ο'ΛΘΙΡΥΠ∆ΩΛΡΘ, ΦΡΘΙπΥΗΘΦΗ ΓΗ ΣΥΗςςΗ ΓΗ 0Υ. /ΛΡΘΗΟ −ΡςΣΛΘ, 
3ΥΗΠΛΗΥ 0ΛΘΛςΩΥΗ : ΚΩΩΣ://ΖΖΖ.ΣΥΗΠΛΗΥ-ΠΛΘΛςΩΥΗ.ϑΡΞΨ.ΙΥ/30/∋190199.+70 
9ΡΛΥ ΟΗς ΓΗΦΥΗΩς 1Ρ. 99-199, 99-200 ΓΞ 17 Π∆Υς 1999, ∆ΛΘςΛ ΤΞΗ Ο ∆ΥΥΗΩΗ ΓΞ 17 Π∆Υς 1999 (−ΡΞΥΘ∆Ο 2ΙΙΛΦΛΗΟ 
1ΞΠΗΥΡ 66 ΓΞ 19 Π∆Υς 1999) 
 
6 ∋. ∗. &ΡΥ∴, ∃. ). )∆ΚΠ∴, 7. ). +∆ΨΗΟ : (ΘςΗΠΕΟΗ ΤΞ∆ΘΩΞΠ ΦΡΠΣΞΩΛΘϑ Ε∴ ΘΞΦΟΗ∆Υ Π∆ϑΘΗΩΛΦ ΥΗςΡΘ∆ΘΦΗ 
ςΣΗΦΩΥΡςΦΡΣ∴. 3ΥΡΦ. 1∆Ω. ∃Φ∆Γ. 6ΦΛ. 94, Σ. 1634-1639 (1997) 
 
7 +. ∋ΡΕΕΗΥΩΛΘ, ∃. %ΡςςΗΟ∆ΗΥς, %. 3ΥΗΘΗΗΟ : 5,3(0∋-160: ∆ ςΩΥΗΘϑΩΚΗΘΗΓ ΨΗΥςΛΡΘ ΡΙ 5,3(0∋. ∋. 
∗ΡΟΟΠ∆ΘΘ, ΗΓΛΩΡΥ, )∆ςΩ 6ΡΙΩΖ∆ΥΗ (ΘΦΥ∴ΣΩΛΡΘ, 7ΚΛΥΓ ,ΘΩΗΥΘ∆ΩΛΡΘ∆Ο :ΡΥΝςΚΡΣ, /ΗΦΩΞΥΗ 1ΡΩΗς ΛΘ &ΡΠΣΞΩΗΥ 
6ΦΛΗΘΦΗ 1039 (1996). 8ΘΗ ΨΗΥςΛΡΘ ΦΡΥΥΛϑΗΗ ΗΩ ∆ΦΞΩ∆ΟΛςΗΗ ΗςΩ ∆ΦΦΗςςΛΕΟΗ ΡΘΟΛΘΗ:  
ΚΩΩΣ://ΖΖΖ.Ης∆Ω.ΝΞΟΗΞΨΗΘ.∆Φ.ΕΗ/ΕΡςςΗΟ∆Η/ΥΛΣΗΠΓ160.ΚΩΠΟ 
 
8 (ΦΚΗΟΡΘ : ΞΘΗ ΟΛςΩΗ ΓΗ ΟΛΗΘς : ΚΩΩΣ://ΖΖΖ.ς∆∆Υ.ΓΗ/ΕΡΘϑ/∆ΥΦΚΛΨ/ΗΦΚΗΟΡΘ.ΚΩΠΟ, 
ΚΩΩΣ://ςΗΥΗΘΓΛΣΛΩ∴.ΘΡΙ∆Γ].ΦΡΠ/ΚΗΥΠΗΩΛΦ/ΦΥ∴ΣΩΡ/ΗΦΚΗΟΡΘ/ΗΦΚΗΟΡΘ.ΚΩΠ, 
ΚΩΩΣ://ςΗΥΗΘΓΛΣΛΩ∴.ΘΡΙ∆Γ].ΦΡΠ/ΚΗΥΠΗΩΛΦ/ΦΥ∴ΣΩΡ/ΗΦΚΗΟΡΘ/Θ]Κ1.ΚΩΠ, 
ΚΩΩΣ://ΖΖΖ.ΩΗΟΗϑΥ∆ΣΚ.ΦΡ.ΞΝ/ΗΩ∀∆Φ 000602131144806&ΥΩΠΡ 0ςΝς[2ΕΤ&∆ΩΠΡ 0ςΝς[2ΕΤ&Σϑ /ΗΩ/97/12/16/
ΗΦςΣ∴16.ΚΩΠΟ, ΚΩΩΣ://ΖΖΖ.ΙΥΗΗΦΡΘϑΥΗςς.ΡΥϑ/ΦΩΣ/ΗΦΚΗΟΡΘ.ΚΩΠΟ, 
ΚΩΩΣ://ΖΖΖ.ΓΛςΛΘΙΡ.ΦΡΠ/ΦΛ/ΓΛΥΩ∴/ΦΛΓΛΥΩ∴ΣΥΡΜΗΦΩΗΦΚΗΟΡΘ.ΚΩΠΟ, ΚΩΩΣ://ΖΖΖ.ΓΛς.ΡΥϑ/ΗΥΗΚΖΡΘ/ςΣΡΡΝΖΡΥΓς.ΚΩΠΟ 
(ςΣΡΡΝΖΡΥΓς) 
 
9 1. ∃. ∗ΗΥςΚΗΘΙΗΟΓ, ,. /. &ΚΞ∆Θϑ : %ΞΟΝ ςΣΛΘ ΥΗςΡΘ∆ΘΦΗ ΤΞ∆ΘΩΞΠ ΦΡΠΣΞΩ∆ΩΛΡΘ, 6ΦΛΗΘΦΗ 275, Σ. 350-356 
(1997) 
 
10 (ΟΗΦΩΥΡΘΛΦ )ΥΡΘΩΛΗΥ )ΡΞΘΓ∆ΩΛΡΘ : &Υ∆ΦΝΛΘϑ ∋(6, 6ΗΦΥΗΩς ΡΙ (ΘΦΥ∴ΣΩΛΡΘ 5ΗςΗ∆ΥΦΚ. :ΛΥΗΩ∆Σ 3ΡΟΛΩΛΦς & 
&ΚΛΣ ∋ΗςΛϑΘ, 2'5ΗΛΟΟ∴ (1998) 
 
11 −. ∋Μ. ∗ΡΟΛ! : &Υ∴ΣΩ∆Θ∆Ο∴ςΛς ΡΙ ∆ΟΟΗϑΗΓ ∃5 ςΩΥΗ∆Π ΦΛΣΚΗΥ. ,Θ ∃ΓΨ∆ΘΦΗς ΛΘ &Υ∴ΣΩΡΟΡϑ∴, (ΞΥΡΦΥ∴ΣΩ'97, 
/ΗΦΩΞΥΗ 1ΡΩΗς ΛΘ &ΡΠΣΞΩΗΥ 6ΦΛΗΘΦΗ 1233, 6ΣΥΛΘϑΗΥ-9ΗΥΟ∆ϑ %ΗΥΟΛΘ +ΗΛΓΗΟΕΗΥϑ 1ΗΖ <ΡΥΝ, Σ. 239-256 (1997) 
 
12 (ΞΥΡΣΗ∆Θ &ΡΠΠΛςςΛΡΘ - ∋ΛΥΗΦΩΡΥ∆ΩΗ ∗ΗΘΗΥ∆Ο ;,,, : &ΡΠΠΞΘΛΦ∆ΩΛΡΘ ΙΥΡΠ ΩΚΗ ΦΡΠΠΛςςΛΡΘ ΩΡ ΩΚΗ 
(ΞΥΡΣΗ∆Θ 3∆ΥΟΛ∆ΠΗΘΩ, ΩΚΗ ΦΡΞΘΦΛΟ, ΩΚΗ ΗΦΡΘΡΠΛΦ ∆ΘΓ ςΡΦΛ∆Ο ΦΡΠΠΛΩΩΗΗ ∆ΘΓ ΩΚΗ ΦΡΠΠΛΩΩΗΗ ΡΙ ΩΚΗ ΥΗϑΛΡΘς 
ΗΘςΞΥΛΘϑ ςΗΦΞΥΛΩ∴ ∆ΘΓ ΩΥΞςΩ ΛΘ ΗΟΗΦΩΥΡΘΛΦ ΦΡΠΠΞΘΛΦ∆ΩΛΡΘ (&20 97-503). (ϑ∆ΟΗΠΗΘΩ ∆ΦΦΗςςΛΕΟΗ ΡΘΟΛΘΗ : 
ΚΩΩΣ://ΖΖΖ.ΛςΣΡ.ΦΗΦ.ΕΗ/ΗΛΙ/ΣΡΟΛΦ∴/97503ΩΡΦ.ΚΩΠΟ 
 
13 (ΞΥΡΣΗ∆Θ 7ΗΟΗΦΡΠΠΞΘΛΦ∆ΩΛΡΘς 6Ω∆ΘΓ∆ΥΓς ,ΘςΩΛΩΞΩΗ ((76,) : ΚΩΩΣ://ΖΖΖ.ΗΩςΛ.ΙΥ/ 
 
14:),36 38% 180-1 : 6ΗΦΞΥΗ +∆ςΚ 6Ω∆ΘΓ∆ΥΓ, )ΗΓΗΥ∆Ο ,ΘΙΡΥΠ∆ΩΛΡΘ 3ΥΡΦΗςςΛΘϑ 6Ω∆ΘΓ∆ΥΓς 3ΞΕΟΛΦ∆ΩΛΡΘ 186, 
86 ∋ΗΣ∆ΥΩΠΗΘΩ ΡΙ &ΡΠΠΗΥΦΗ, 1∆ΩΛΡΘ∆Ο ,ΘςΩΛΩΞΩΗ ΡΙ 6Ω∆ΘΓ∆ΥΓς ∆ΘΓ 7ΗΦΚΘΡΟΡϑ∴, 1∆ΩΛΡΘ∆Ο 7ΗΦΚΘΛΦ∆Ο 
,ΘΙΡΥΠ∆ΩΛΡΘ 6ΗΥΨΛΦΗ, 6ΣΥΛΘϑΙΛΗΟΓ, 9ΛΥϑΛΘΛ∆ (1994). ∃ΦΦΗςςΛΕΟΗ ΡΘΟΛΘΗ ςΡΞς: 
ΚΩΩΣ://ΖΖΖ.ΛΩΟ.ΘΛςΩ.ϑΡΨ/ΓΛΨ897/ΣΞΕς/ΙΛΣς180-1.ΚΩΠ 
 
15 ∃. ∗ΡΥΗ, 9ΛΦΗ-3ΥπςΛΓΗΘΩ ΓΗς (Ω∆Ως-8ΘΛς : ,ΘΩΗΥΨΛΗΖ ∆Ξ 6∆Θ −ΡςΗ 0ΗΥΦΞΥ∴ 1ΗΖς (25/1/1999) 
 
16 ,(((-31363 : ΚΩΩΣ://ϑΥΡΞΣΗΥ.ΛΗΗΗ.ΡΥϑ/ϑΥΡΞΣς/1363/ΛΘΓΗ[.ΚΩΠΟ 
 
17 ,(7)-3.,;, 3ΞΕΟΛΦ-.Η∴ ,ΘΙΥ∆ςΩΥΞΦΩΞΥΗ (;.509) : ΚΩΩΣ://ΖΖΖ.ΛΗΩΙ.ΡΥϑ/ΚΩΠΟ.ΦΚ∆ΥΩΗΥς/ΣΝΛ[-ΦΚ∆ΥΩΗΥ.ΚΩΠΟ 
 
18 ,(7)-6/0,0(, 0∆ΛΟ 6ΗΦΞΥΛΩ∴ (ςΠΛΠΗ) : ΚΩΩΣ://ΖΖΖ.ΛΗΩΙ.ΡΥϑ/ΚΩΠΟ.ΦΚ∆ΥΩΗΥς/ςΠΛΠΗ-ΦΚ∆ΥΩΗΥ.ΚΩΠΟ 
 
19 %. (. .∆ΘΗ : ∃ ςΛΟΛΦΡΘ-Ε∆ςΗΓ ΘΞΦΟΗ∆Υ ςΣΛΘ ΤΞ∆ΘΩΞΠ ΦΡΠΣΞΩΗΥ. 1∆ΩΞΥΗ 393, Σ. 133-137 (1998) 
 
20 0. .ΞΩΩΗΥ, ). /ΗΣΥπΨΡςΩ : 6∴ΠΕΛΡςΗ ΨΡΘ .Υ∴ΣΩΡϑΥ∆ΣΚΛΗ ΞΘΓ ΓΛϑΛΩ∆ΟΗΘ :∆ςςΗΥ]ΗΛΦΚΗΘ: ΗΙΙΛ]ΛΗΘΩΗΥ 6ΦΚΞΩ] 
ΓΗς 8ΥΚΗΕΗΥΥΗΦΚΩΗς ΓΛϑΛΩ∆ΟΗΥ 0ΗΓΛΗΘ. ∃ Σ∆Υ∆ϖΩΥΗ ΛΘ 7∆ϑΞΘϑςΕ∆ΘΓ ΓΗς 6. ∋ΗΞΩςΦΚΗΘ 
,7-6ΛΦΚΗΥΚΗΛΩςΝΡΘϑΥΗςςΗς ΓΗς %6, (1999) 
 
21 ). /ΗΣΥπΨΡςΩ : /Ης ςΩ∆ΘΓ∆ΥΓς ΦΥ∴ΣΩΡϑΥ∆ΣΚΛΤΞΗς ΓΞ ;;,-ΗΠΗ ςΛΗΦΟΗ : ∃(6 ΗΩ ,(((-31363. ∃ Σ∆Υ∆ΛΩΥΗ ΛΘ 
/∆ ∗∆]ΗΩΩΗ ΓΗς 0∆ΩΚπΠ∆ΩΛΦΛΗΘς (1999) 
 
22 ). /ΗΣΥπΨΡςΩ : 3ΗΩΗΥ :. 6ΚΡΥ, ΣΥΛ[ 1ΗΨ∆ΘΟΛΘΘ∆ 1998. ∃ Σ∆Υ∆ΛΩΥΗ ΛΘ /∆ ∗∆]ΗΩΩΗ ΓΗς 0∆ΩΚπΠ∆ΩΛΦΛΗΘς 
(1999). 
 
23 ). /ΗΣΥπΨΡςΩ : ∃(6 ΞΘΓ ,(((-31363, ΓΛΗ ΝΥ∴ΣΩΡϑΥ∆ΣΚΛςΦΚΗΘ 6Ω∆ΘΓ∆ΥΓς ΓΗς 21. −∆ΚΥΚΞΘΓΗΥΩς. ∃ 
Σ∆Υ∆ΛΩΥΗ ΛΘ 7∆ϑΞΘϑςΕ∆ΘΓ ΓΗς 6. ∋ΗΞΩςΦΚΗΘ ,7-6ΛΦΚΗΥΚΗΛΩςΝΡΘϑΥΗςςΗς ΓΗς %6, (1999) 
 
24 1,67 ∃(6 +ΡΠΗ 3∆ϑΗ : ΚΩΩΣ://ΦςΥΦ.ΘΛςΩ.ϑΡΨ/ΗΘΦΥ∴ΣΩΛΡΘ/∆Ης/∆ΗςΒΚΡΠΗ.ΚΩΠ 
 
25 16∃ 7ΗΠΣΗςΩ ∋ΡΦΞΠΗΘΩς : 1∃&6,0 5000, 5004, 5100∃, 5201, 5203 
 
26 &Κ. 3ΗΥςςΡΘ : 3ΗΘΩΛΞΠ ,,, ςΗΥΛ∆Ο ΘΞΠΕΗΥ Λς ςΡΙΩ ςΖΛΩΦΚ∆ΕΟΗ ∆ΙΩΗΥ ∆ΟΟ. ,Θ Φ'Ω 0∆ϑ∆]ΛΘ ΙüΥ &ΡΠΣΞΩΗΥ 7ΗΦΚΘΛΝ 
(1999) 
 
27 3ΥΛΦΗΖ∆ΩΗΥΚΡΞςΗ&ΡΡΣΗΥς ,ΘΨΗςΩΛϑ∆ΩΛΡΘς //& : 7ΚΗ &ΡΥΣΡΥ∆ΩΗ 1ΗΩςΣΛΡΘΘ∆ϑΗ &ΥΛςΛς. ,ΘΙΡΥΠ∆ΩΛΡΘς 
∆ΦΦΗςςΛΕΟΗς ΡΘΟΛΘΗ :  
ΚΩΩΣ://ΖΖΖ.ΣΥΛΦΗΖ∆ΩΗΥΚΡΞςΗΦΡΡΣΗΥς.ΙΠ/Η[ΩΖΗΕ/ΘΦΣΥΗςςΥΗΟΗ∆ςΗ.ΘςΙ/∋ΡΦ,∋/%81092772821633%8525673&0
06∃)∃91 
 
28 6Π∆ΥΩΦ∆ΥΓ ∋ΗΨΗΟΡΣΣΗΥ ∃ςςΡΦΛ∆ΩΛΡΘ : ΚΩΩΣ://ΖΖΖ.ςΦ∆ΥΓ.ΡΥϑ/ 
 
29 3. :. 6ΚΡΥ : 3ΡΟ∴ΘΡΠΛ∆Ο-ΩΛΠΗ ∆ΟϑΡΥΛΩΚΠς ΙΡΥ ΣΥΛΠΗ Ι∆ΦΩΡΥΛ]∆ΩΛΡΘ ∆ΘΓ ΓΛςΦΥΗΩΗ ΟΡϑ∆ΥΛΩΚΠς ΡΘ ∆ ΤΞ∆ΘΩΞΠ 
ΦΡΠΣΞΩΗΥ, 6,∃0 −ΡΞΥΘ∆Ο ΡΙ &ΡΠΣΞΩΛΘϑ 26, Σ. 1484-1509 (1997) 
 
30 3. :. 6ΚΡΥ : 4Ξ∆ΘΩΞΠ &ΡΠΣΞΩΛΘϑ. 3ΥΡΦΗΗΓΛΘϑς ΡΙ ΩΚΗ ,ΘΩΗΥΘ∆ΩΛΡΘ∆Ο &ΡΘϑΥΗςς ΡΙ 0∆ΩΚΗΠ∆ΩΛΦΛ∆Θς, 
%ΗΥΟΛΘ, ∋ΡΦΞΠΗΘΩ∆ 0∆ΩΚΗΠ∆ΩΛΦ∆, −ΡΞΥΘ∆Ο ΓΗΥ ∋ΗΞΩςΦΚΗΘ 0∆ΩΚΗΠ∆ΩΛΝΗΥ-9ΗΥΗΛΘΛϑΞΘϑ (1998) 
 
31 3. :. 6ΚΡΥ : &ΡΠΠΞΘΛΦ∆ΩΛΡΘ ΣΗΥςΡΘΘΗΟΟΗ (1998) 
 
32 8.6. &ΡΘϑΥΗςς, 2ΙΙΛΦΗ ΡΙ 7ΗΦΚΘΡΟΡϑ∴ ∃ςςΗςςΠΗΘΩ : (ΟΗΦΩΥΡΘΛΦ 6ΞΥΨΗΛΟΟ∆ΘΦΗ ΛΘ ∆ ∋ΛϑΛΩ∆Ο ∃ϑΗ. 
27∃-%3-,7&-149, :∆ςΚΛΘϑΩΡΘ, ∋&: 8.6. ∗ΡΨΗΥΘΠΗΘΩ 3ΥΛΘΩΛΘϑ 2ΙΙΛΦΗ (−ΞΟ∴ 1995) 
 
33 ∋. :∆ϑΘΗΥ : &ΡΠΠΞΘΛΦ∆ΩΛΡΘ ΣΗΥςΡΘΘΗΟΟΗ (1999) 
 
34 7ΚΗ :∆ςςΗΘ∆∆Υ ∃ΥΥ∆ΘϑΗΠΗΘΩ ΡΘ ([ΣΡΥΩ &ΡΘΩΥΡΟς ΙΡΥ &ΡΘΨΗΘΩΛΡΘ∆Ο ∃ΥΠς ∆ΘΓ ∋Ξ∆Ο-8ςΗ ∗ΡΡΓς ∆ΘΓ 
7ΗΦΚΘΡΟΡϑΛΗς : ΚΩΩΣ://ΖΖΖ.Ζ∆ςςΗΘ∆∆Υ.ΡΥϑ/ 
 
35 6. :ΥΛϑΚΩ : ∃Θ ∆ΣΣΥ∆Λς∆Ο ΡΙ ΩΗΦΚΘΡΟΡϑΛΗς ΡΙ ΣΡΟΛΩΛΦ∆Ο ΦΡΘΩΥΡΟ. ,ΘΩΗΥΛΠ 6ΩΞΓ∴ ΙΡΥ ΩΚΗ 672∃ (19/1/1998) 
 
 
